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The complete loss of visual awareness resulting from a lesion to the primary visual cortex (V1) 
suggests that this region is indispensable for conscious visual perception. There are however 
a number cases of conscious perception in the absence of V1 which appear to challenge this 
conclusion. These include reports of patients with bilateral V1 lesions sustained at an early age 
whose conscious vision has spontaneously recovered, as well as stroke patients who have 
recovered some conscious vision with the help of rehabilitation programs. In addition, the 
phenomenon of hemianopic completion and percepts induced by brain stimulation suggest that 
V1 may not be necessary for conscious perception in all circumstances. Furthermore, that the 
visual abilities in the cat are associated with the recovery of normal extrastriate tuning properties 
rather than emulation of V1 functions suggests that there is nothing unique about the functional 
properties of this region in visual awareness. Rather, the dramatic effect of a V1 lesion on visual 
awareness may be due to its role in providing the majority of extrastriate visual input, the loss 
of which abolishes normal neural responsiveness throughout the visual cortex.
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cases some occipital cortex may remain functional, which com-
plicates interpretation. For example, Bova et al. (2008), reported a 
patient who suffered bilateral occipital lobe infarction at the age of 
2 years 6 months. In the acute phase, his visual behavior was con-
sistent with complete bilateral visual loss; fixation was absent, there 
was no blink response to threat, and he was only able to recognize 
objects and family members using compensatory (touch and audi-
tory) abilities. However, 18 months after the lesion, he could see 
and reach small objects on the ground, name colors, and recognize 
himself and his relatives even in photographs. At 6 years 8 months, 
visual recognition acuity was 10/10 in both eyes and neuro-oph-
thalmological examination was normal, except for persistence of the 
visual field defect in the upper hemifield and a selective impairment 
for complex visuospatial skills. This case appears to suggest that 
conscious perception can almost fully recover in the absence of V1. 
However, MRI scan suggested a partial sparing of the striate cortex, 
and this was confirmed by the presence of some residual occipital 
response of the VEPs, suggesting the presence of some functional 
striate cortex. Therefore, while the presence of some residual V1 
may not fully explain conscious visual perception in this patient, it 
may have facilitated recovery (see, e.g., Payne and Rushmore (2003)) 
and complicates the implications of this study for understanding 
the role of V1 in visual awareness. The vast majority of V1 lesions 
are incomplete, and thus the number of cases from which strong 
theoretical conclusions can be drawn is limited.
There are however few cases in which the absence of early visual 
cortex has been verified. Amicuzi et al. (2006) reported the case 
of a 5-year-old girl in whom ultrasonography 16 days after birth 
showed an enlargement of the occipital horns of the lateral ventri-
cles, mostly on the left side. At the age of 5, MRI scans disclosed an 
A lesion to the primary visual cortex (V1) abolishes all conscious 
visual perception in the corresponding part of the visual field. 
However, the ability of some patients to unconsciously detect and 
discriminate stimuli within the field defect (see Cowey, 2010 for 
reviews of “blindsight”), implies that the loss of perceptual experi-
ence is not simply due to information failing to reach the visual 
system, and strongly implicate V1 in visual awareness. The role of 
V1 in determining the content of subjective awareness is also sup-
ported by studies carried out in neurologically normal observers 
(see Tong, 2003; Ro, 2010 for reviews).
There are however a number cases of conscious visual percep-
tion in the absence of V1 which appear to challenge the view that 
this region plays an indispensable role in visual awareness. These 
include reports of children born without V1, stroke patients who 
have recovered some conscious vision with the help of rehabilita-
tion programs, as well as the phenomenon of hemianopic com-
pletion and percepts induced by brain stimulation. Such cases are 
important to the study of neural correlates of consciousness (NCC): 
if conscious perception of a given attribute is initially abolished by 
a lesion but subsequently recovers, this indicates that the NCC of 
that attribute is not fixed to the affected brain region. In this review 
we will consider the implications of plasticity to understanding the 
role of V1 in visual awareness.
ConsCious perCeption after a bilateral V1 lesion
For the present discussion, the critical question is the extent to which 
visual awareness can recover in the complete absence of V1, as this 
would indicate that V1 is not indispensable for awareness. Cases of 
bilateral V1 lesion are thus of paramount interest. However, reports 
of complete bilateral lesions of occipital cortex are rare, as in many Frontiers in Psychology  |  Consciousness Research    January 2011  | Volume 2  | Article 6  |  2
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responses were found with EEG or fMRI. Thirdly, it appears that 
parietal and temporal regions gave rise to conscious perception 
in this subject.
plastiCity following unilateral V1 lesions
While the evidence from bilateral occipital lesions demonstrates 
that conscious vision can recover in the complete absence of V1, the 
neural basis of that recovery is unclear. More is known about the 
development of new visual field maps accompanying visual func-
tion recovery after unilateral V1 lesions. Muckli et al. (2009) report 
a subject whose development of the right cerebral hemisphere ter-
minated before the 7th week of embryonic gestation. Despite the 
complete loss of right hemisphere at birth, the patient had close to 
normal vision in both hemifields and successfully mastered activi-
ties requiring bilateral coordination such as roller skating and bike 
riding. fMRI mapping revealed that the patient’s remaining hemi-
sphere contained visual field representations of not only he con-
tralateral visual hemifield (as is the case in neurologically normal 
development) but, surprisingly, also maps of the ipsilateral (left) 
visual hemifield: islands of ipsilateral visual field representations 
were located along the representations of the vertical meridian. 
In V1, smooth and continuous maps from contra- and ipsilateral 
hemifield overlap each other, whereas in ventral V2 and V3 ipsi-
lateral quarter field representations invaded small distinct cortical 
patches. This is significant because normal subjects do not show 
ipsilateral representations in early visual areas.
Brain plasticity tends to be more evident after congenital or early 
acquired brain injury (see, e.g., Werth, 2008; Guzzetta et al., 2010 for 
reviews). While potential for plasticity is greatly reduced in adult-
hood, the fact that visual field rehabilitation protocols have at least 
limited success in shrinking visual field defects (e.g., Zihl and von 
Cramon, 1986; Kerkhoff et al., 1994; Kasten et al., 1997; Schmielau 
and Wong, 2007) indicates that some functionally significant neural 
plasticity does occur. Furthermore there is also electrophysiologi-
cal evidence of plastic changes in the adult monkey visual cortex. 
For example, after a few months of wearing prisms that laterally 
reversed the visual field, neurons in the macaque V1 respond to 
both ipsi- as well as to contralateral visual fields (Sugita, 1996).
The link between neural plasticity and functional recovery of 
conscious vision was recently investigated by Henriksson et al. 
(2007),  who  trained  a  61-year-old  patient  with  homonymous 
hemianopia with flicker stimulation. The training was performed 
3 years after the stroke, at a stage in which the subject showed a 
stable homonymous hemianopia, with no evoked neuromagnetic 
responses in response to visual stimulation of his blind hemifield. 
During training, the patient became conscious of stimuli presented 
in the blind hemifield; form vision emerged, and the far periphery 
of the blind hemifield brightened. Changes in neural responsiveness 
during training were documented with magnetoencephalography, 
and the cortical organization after training was examined with 
fMRI. The key finding was that, after training, visual information 
from both hemifields was processed mainly in the intact hemi-
sphere. Specifically, fMRI mapping revealed a representation of 
both the blind and the normal hemifields in the same set of corti-
cal areas in the intact hemisphere, more specifically in the visual 
motion-sensitive area V5/MT, in a region around the superior tem-
poral sulcus and in retinotopic visual areas V1, V2, V3, and V3a.
absence of occipital pole bilaterally, as well as of occipitotemporal 
regions in the right hemisphere and occipitoparietal regions in 
the left hemisphere. Functional examinations revealed that basic 
visual abilities such as visual acuity, contrast sensitivity and visual 
field were present although somewhat compromised. On visual 
perceptual assessment, a selective impairment of figure-ground 
segregation was found, whereas color, form, and orientation dis-
crimination were almost normal. Visual recognition impairment 
was present for objects, faces, actions, and scenes. While the neural 
correlates of conscious vision in this subject are unclear due to 
the lack of neuroimaging evidence, it is clear that it must be the 
remaining extrastriate cortex which enables conscious perception 
to arise. This was supported by diffusion tensor imaging (DTI) 
evidence (Amicuzi et al., 2006) which highlighted connections from 
lateral geniculate nucleus to the intact extrastriate cortex which 
bypass the damaged areas. Expansion of pathways that can bypass 
V1 and directly connect subcortical nuclei with extrastriate visual 
structures is believed to be critical in neural plasticity following the 
loss of V1 and may also mediate blindsight (see, e.g., Cowey, 2004; 
Payne and Lomber, 2002).
A second intriguing case involves a 21-year-old male with exten-
sive bilateral damage present since birth (Giaschi et al., 2003). This 
case is highly informative because the absence of the striate cortex 
was confirmed with anatomical MRI scans as well as using and 
functional MRI and high-resolution EEG. Furthermore, the neural 
basis of conscious perception was investigated using fMRI.
The visual impairment, likely to be due to hypoxic brain insult 
at birth, was severe. At the age of 2 years, he was diagnosis of con-
genital cortical visual impairment. Full-field flash stimuli evoked 
no potentials from the occipital cortex and no alpha rhythm and 
or responses on eye opening and closure was seen in EEG. When 
examined at the age of 21, he could identify a few simple shapes, by 
scanning them repeatedly close to his eyes. The patient was able to 
name the colors of large stimuli, but he made many errors in color 
discrimination on the Quantitative Color Vision Test. He could 
appreciate size differences and count coins, without touch, only 
when they were widely separated. The patients was however able to 
detect stimuli moving at high speeds; at low speeds (below 3.5°/s), 
his accuracy fell to chance performance. Importantly, he reported 
that he could “see” the motion, indicating that his motion detection 
ability was not blindsight; his detection ability was accompanied by 
phenomenal awareness. The neural basis of this motion perception 
was investigated with fMRI. Although the motion-selective area V5/
MT appeared to be anatomically intact, no functional activation 
was observed in this region. Instead, fast radial motion activated 
regions in right premotor cortex, right medial posterior cingulate, 
right medial precuneus, left anterior superior temporal gyrus, and 
left and right posterior superior temporal sulcus. No activation was 
induced by the slow stimuli.
This case is interesting for several reasons. Firstly, although con-
scious residual vision for motion in the absence of awareness of 
other stimulus attributes has been previously reported (Riddoch, 
1917), this is the only reported case in which the absence of striate 
cortex has been verified. Secondly, this case provides both ana-
tomical and neuroimaging evidence indicating that some visual 
perception is possible in the complete absence of V1; no striate 
cortex tissue was visible on anatomic MRI scan, and no evoked www.frontiersin.org  January 2011  | Volume 2  | Article 6  |  3
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in both hemifields. This result shows that visual stimulation of 
GY’s blind field can give rise to visual experiences, if the blind field 
stimulus is part of a larger bilateral stimulus.
The neural basis of such completion has been recently studied 
by Weil et al. (2009) in a patient with a homonymous hemianopia 
following occipital stroke that was associated with hemianopic per-
ceptual completion across the blind field. Completion was found to 
be associated with activation anterior to retinotopic cortex in the 
lingual gyrus in the right occipital cortex, contralateral to the lesion, 
ipsilateral to the illusory edge of the stimulus. This region was 
located in visually responsive ventral visual cortex near to reported 
coordinates for the human lateral occipital complex (Avidan et al., 
2002). Importantly, activity in the early visual cortical areas V1–V3 
was not associated with completion, demonstrating that visual 
awareness does not always depend on activity in V1.
A further example of conscious perception without the develop-
ment of an ipsilateral visual field representation in the intact V1 has 
come from studies using transcranial magnetic stimulation (TMS). 
When TMS is applied over the extrastriate visual areas, neuro-
logically normal observers perceive flashes of light (phosphenes). 
However, when TMS is applied unilaterally over presumably intact 
extrastriate areas in GY’ damaged hemisphere, he does not perceive 
phosphenes; this is consistent with the view that extrastriate activa-
tion cannot reach awareness in the absence of V1. However, when 
TMS was applied over the extrastriate area V5/MT in both the 
damaged and intact hemisphere in close temporal proximity, GY 
perceived bilateral phosphenes that extend into the blind hemifield. 
Using this technique, GY could even experience colored percepts 
in his blind field (Silvanto et al., 2008).
At the perceptual level, TMS-induced bilateral phosphenes seem 
similar to hemianopic completion, and it may be that they are mediated 
by the intact extrastriate cortex via callosal connections. Consistent 
with this view, a DTI study by Bridge et al. (2008) found a substantial 
cortico-cortical connection in GY between V5/MT bilaterally, consist-
ent with the possibility that information can be transferred from the 
damaged to the intact hemisphere. While the neural basis of these 
blind field phosphene is unclear, the critical point is that GY’s intact 
V1 cannot be directly involved as it does not contain a retinotopic 
representation of the blind visual field. The main implication of these 
finding therefore is that a retinotopic representation of the visual field 
in V1 cannot be necessary for phenomenal awareness.
what does plastiCity tell about the role of V1 in 
awareness?
The evidence can be summarized as follows: after a unilateral V1 
lesion, spontaneous or training-induced plasticity can lead to the 
development of ipsilateral visual field maps in the unaffected V1, 
in both children and adults. The functional recovery resulting from 
spontaneous plasticity is robust in childhood, with visual functions 
being almost normal (Muckli et al., 2009). When the lesion occurs in 
adulthood after the visual system has fully developed, the extent of 
visual recovery is much smaller, and the development of new visual 
field maps in the intact V1 may require behavioral rehabilitation 
programs (Henriksson et al., 2007). These cases support the view 
that V1 is necessary for visual awareness, as the development of 
ipsilateral visual field maps in the intact early visual cortex appears 
to be necessary for the recovery of conscious vision.
This case differs from that reported by Muckli et al. (2009) in 
that restored function and the coinciding involvement of the con-
tralesional hemisphere were due to therapeutic intervention in an 
elderly patient rather than spontaneous recovery occurring in early 
life. Nevertheless, there is a remarkable similarity between them: 
in both cases, conscious vision appears to be associated with the 
development of ipsilateral visual field representations in the early 
visual cortex (although the extent to which visual recovery depends 
particularly on V1 is not known). It thus appears that, as long as 
some functional V1 remains, it can participate in the mediation 
of visual awareness from spatial positions that it did not encode 
prior to the lesion. These unilateral cases are thus not inconsistent 
with the view that retinotopic representation of the visual field in 
V1 plays a necessary role in visual awareness.
phenomenal awareness in blindsight
In the above examples, at least some visual awareness was possible 
after a V1 lesion. However, in most patients visual information fails 
to reach awareness although it can in some circumstances uncon-
sciously detected. Perhaps the most frequently studied blindsight 
subject is GY, who has a large unilateral lesion in the left medial 
occipital lobe, caused by a traffic accident at the age of 8. Striate 
cortex is absent in the left hemisphere, except at the occipital pole 
corresponding to about three to four degrees of macular spar-
ing. Although GY (and other blindsight patients) perform well in 
numerous visual tasks (see Stoerig and Cowey, 1997 for reviews), 
there is no phenomenal awareness associated with these functions 
in the blind field.
Interestingly, unlike in the subjects reported by Muckli et al. 
(2009) and Henriksson et al. (2007), V1 in GY’s intact hemi-
sphere is not activated by stimuli presented in the blind field that 
induce blindsight. In contrast, extrastriate areas in the damaged 
as well as intact hemisphere (such as V5/MT) do show BOLD 
responses to stimuli presented in the blind field. However, these 
extrastriate activations seem to be unable to give rise to conscious 
perception in the absence of V1. Taken together with the find-
ings of Henriksson et al. (2007), it seems that after a unilateral 
V1 lesion, conscious vision tends to primarily recover through 
the development of retinotopic representations of the affected 
field in the contralesional V1. Representations of the blind field 
in the extrastriate (either in the intact or damaged hemisphere) 
do not seem to enable awareness to arise, at least when the lesion 
is sustained in adulthood.
There are however circumstances in which hemianopic patients 
with a V1 lesion sustained in adulthood can experience qualia in 
the blind field. An example of this is hemianopic completion, which 
refers to the perceptual completion of figures located across the 
vertical meridian in the context of hemianopia, such that one half 
of the figure falls within the blind hemifield (e.g., Bender and 
Kahn,  1949).  Marcel  (1998)  used  after-images  to  demonstrate 
veridical conscious perception of shape in GY’s blind field when 
it was accompanied by a shape in the sighted field. When only the 
normal hemifield was exposed to visual stimulation, an afterimage 
appeared in the normal hemifield; in contrast, when the blind field 
was stimulated, no afterimage was perceived. Critically, when both 
the normal and the blind hemifields were stimulated in combina-
tion, such that the formed a good Gestalt, the after-image appeared Frontiers in Psychology  |  Consciousness Research    January 2011  | Volume 2  | Article 6  |  4
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2002). However, this does imply a change in neural tuning – a visual 
area with somewhat similar neural tuning as a normal V1 may take 
over the role. Consequently, the particular visual ability may be 
impaired because the neural properties in that region may be less 
suited for this purpose than those in the normal V1.
Interestingly, neural tuning in the extrastriate cortex of the mon-
key shows rather less recovery after a V1 lesion. Rodman et al. (1989) 
found weak responses to visual stimuli in V5/MT (with only 5% of 
neurons responding strongly to visual stimulation), and receptive 
fields were difficult to localize precisely. A different conclusion was 
reached by Girard et al. (1992), who used cooling to deactivate V1 and 
found that 80% of neurons remained responsive to visual stimula-
tion. However, the cooling plate did not cover the whole of V1 (affect-
ing only approximately 4° of the lower quadrant); thus the majority 
of V5/MT neurons did not lose their V1 input, which could explain 
their high level of responsiveness. Subsequent studies (e.g., Azzopardi 
et al., 2003; Collins et al., 2003) on monkeys found no or severely 
reduced neural responsiveness in V5/MT. For example, in the study 
by Azzopardi et al. (2003) the neural responses to moving stimuli 
in V5/MT were as small as the V5/MT responses to static stimuli in 
the normal brain. More recently, functional MRI in monkeys dem-
onstrates weak responses of extrastriate cortex to visual stimulation 
following a chronic V1 lesion, with overall activity evoked by visual 
stimulation approximately one-fifth of normal levels (Schmid et al., 
2010). Interestingly, this residual activity was critically dependent on 
the lateral geniculate nucleus as it disappeared when that structure 
was inactivated. It remains possible however that in monkeys with 
V1 damage in infancy can develop more normal neural selectivity 
in extrastriate cortex, as there is significantly more residual vision 
compared to monkeys with lesions sustained in adulthood (Moore 
et al., 1996). Nevertheless, the electrophysiological evidence from 
lesioned monkeys suggests that in the absence of V1, the functioning 
of the extrastriate cortex is severely compromised.
In summary, while animal studies cannot conclusively answer 
the question of whether the recovery of visual awareness requires 
the development of functional properties of a normal V1 in another 
brain area, they suggest that this is not required. Rather, it appears 
that as long as extrastriate areas have normal functionality, visual 
perception can arise.
ConClusion
The objective of this review was to consider the implications of 
neural plasticity for understanding the role of V1 in visual awareness. 
Although a lesion to this region abolishes all phenomenal awareness, 
conscious vision can recover; the extent of this recovery appears to be 
linked to the age at which the lesion was sustained. The ability of the 
visual system to create conscious visual percepts in the absence of V1 
suggests that there is fundamentally nothing unique about specific 
anatomically defined areas such as V1 in enabling conscious percep-
tion. Furthermore, that the extrastriate neural plasticity enabling 
visual recovery in the cat is associated with the recovery of normal 
tuning properties rather than emulation of functional properties of 
V1 neurons suggests that there is nothing unique about the neural 
selectivity of this region in visual awareness. Rather, the dramatic 
effect of a V1 lesion on visual awareness may be due to its role as the 
provider of input to most of extrastriate cortex that enables normal 
extrastriate neural responsiveness.
Importantly however, the cases in which V1 is missing bilater-
ally (Giaschi et al., 2003; Amicuzi et al., 2006) demonstrate that 
plastic changes which enable some conscious perception to recover 
do not necessarily require V1. While visual functions may remain 
compromised, the fact that conscious vision can develop at all 
indicates that the brain does not need V1 to give rise to conscious 
visual percepts. Finally, the phenomena of hemianopic completion 
(e.g., Bender and Kahn, 1949; Marcel, 1998; Weil et al., 2009) and 
blind field phosphene perception (Silvanto et al., 2007, 2008) also 
demonstrate that that some conscious vision is possible without 
the development of an ipsilateral visual field representation in the 
contralesional V1. While the extent to which plasticity plays role 
in these latter phenomena is not clear, they are nevertheless incon-
sistent with the view that a retinotopic representation of the visual 
field in V1 is a prerequisite of all visual awareness.
are funCtional properties of V1 neCessary for 
awareness?
A brain recovering from lesions sustained early in life have undergone 
a very different developmental path than that of a neurologically nor-
mal subject, and one might question the usefulness of referring in this 
context to visual areas which are found in normally developed visual 
cortex. While this may be true, the other side of the coin is that there 
appears to be nothing unique about specific anatomically defined 
areas such as V1 in enabling conscious perception. Of course, what 
might make V1 necessary for awareness may not be its anatomical 
position at the back head, but rather, the functional properties and 
anatomical connectivity of its neurons. If we define V1 not in terms 
of its anatomical location as the portion of the brain at the occipital 
pole around the calcarine sulcus, but rather in terms of the functional 
properties of its neurons, the question becomes: is the recovery of 
conscious perception a consequence of unaffected cortex taking over 
the functional properties of V1? If so, this would suggest that V1 (in 
its functional definition) is indeed necessary for visual awareness.
It is impossible to offer a conclusive answer to this question, 
but electrophysiological evidence obtained in the cat may offer 
some clues. Neurons in posteromedial lateral suprasylvian area, an 
extrastriate visual area in the cat, lose neural tuning after a damaged 
to the visual cortex. However, neural responsiveness can recover, 
especially if the lesion has been sustained in childhood (e.g., Spear 
and Baumann, 1979; Tong et al., 1984). The important question 
is whether this recovery leads to neurons developing the response 
properties of the damaged cortex. This question has been addressed 
in a number of studies (e.g., Maffrei and Fiorentini, 1973; Movshon 
et al., 1978; Guido et al., 1992). The key finding is that the spatial or 
temporal response properties in this region are not different from 
those found in normal cats, and they are unlike those of normal 
striate cortex cells. In other words, the outcome of neural plasticity 
is the development of normal tuning properties. That these neurons 
did not take over the neural properties of the damaged cortex sug-
gests visual recovery in the cat does not rely on V1 functions being 
emulated by other brain areas.
That the functional properties of V1 are not emulated by other 
areas does not imply that the functional role of V1 in a given visual 
skill cannot be taken over by the unaffected cortex. Indeed, there is 
evidence that visual abilities that are normally based on V1 activity 
may rely on other areas after a V1 lesion (see Payne and Lomber, www.frontiersin.org  January 2011  | Volume 2  | Article 6  |  5
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